Archive for March, 2008

SEBI Tightens the Screws On Brokers

2 comments Written on March 31st, 2008 by
Categories: Commentary
SEBI's new proposed rules for brokerages include very strict guidelines on how they should work with their clients. Some salient points.
The Exposure/Turnover limit given by the trading members should be commensurate with the financial details of the clients reported in the KYC. The said limit to be specified in the KYC and strictly adhered to or the details in KYC to be suitably modified.

Only person with financial standing at least comparable to that of the client he is introducing should be accepted as introducer. The documents such as PAN Card, Income Tax Return / Proof of residence etc to be maintained alongwith the KYC of the client to whom he is introducing.

This is weird. If I don't know someone who is as rich as me, I can't trade? (on a funny note, What does Mukesh Ambani do?)

The KYC point is well taken, that trading limits should be set on the basis of financial information provided by the client. But it is also stupid because: Client finances change EVERY SINGLE MONTH. There is no "credit rating" system for individuals in India, which can give anyone an idea of how creditworthy a person is. The broker may give a small limit based on today's data, but the person may get a 50% increase in wealth or may inherit a fortune later, but he can't use that fortune to trade! And if brokers are to do KYC every few months, people will get pissed off.

KYC makes sense only if there is a centralised system managing all people's records, and all agencies (banks, credit cards etc.) reporting to that system. Otherwise it's a waste of effort.

While recommending purchase or sale of any security / derivatives contract to a client, trading member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such client on the basis of the facts disclosed by such client as to his / her financial position, other security holdings, past investment experience & pattern and investment needs.
So brokers can't recommend anything anymore. They are not going to get your holding information, your financial position etc. Let's face it, no body gets this info. And reco's are a good part of brokerage revenue.
Prior to the execution of transactions on behalf of a non-institutional client, trading member shall make reasonable efforts to obtain the following information regarding the client
  • Financial status
  • Investment objectives
  • Past investment experience & pattern
  • Risk appetite of the client.
  • Such other information considered to be reasonable by the trading member
I suppose we will all have to keep this handy, because we may not be allowed to make transactions without this info. I don't even know if I want to part with this information.
The clients may be required to have certain minimum amount of networth (e.g.5 lacs) for trading in Derivative Segment. A net-worth certificate from a practicing Chartered Accountant or acknowledgement for I.T. return filed should be accepted in this regard.
Fantastic. Now I must pay a CA to give me a net worth statement before I buy derivatives? Isn't this a sure fire way to kill the market, which already sees little transactions? Why can't this be done within the KYC norms?

People will defend this saying we should limit people's losses. I say bull. People who want to do this will do it anyway, and give some random CA statement if required. It's only going to trouble the majority, i.e. those that can really afford it.

Most of the remaining recommendations are good, like maintaining a Chinese wall between the trading and analyst operations, ensuring full and fair disclosure of holdings of every analyst, making brokers liable for fraud on their employees part etc.

What is missing is the extent of penalties. SEBI is a toothless tiger, or has been to date. They should present how they can fine misdemeanors heavily and have it stand, like the US SEC. Many of SEBI's harsh verdicts get thrown out at the SAT level, and the rest at the court level - what use is this? No disgorgement, no system of real penalties - no wonder entities like Karvy still survive. Can we please show some real strength, SEBI?

Note: This is not yet a regulation. SEBI has requested for comments and we should mail them as given in the article (you and I can also mail) before April 15.

Companies must show mark-to-market losses on Derivatives: ICAI

1 Comment » Written on March 31st, 2008 by
Categories: Commentary
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) has announced that companies holding derivative contracts must provide for losses on them on a mark-to-market basis. Prior to this announcement, the standard for derivatives (AS 30) was to be applicable only from April 2011. ("Recommended" from 2009).

AS 30 is still not mandatory, but ICAI maintains that if AS 30 is not followed, the losses must be mentioned separately by the company and failing that, by the auditors, from March 31, 2008 onwards. It will be interesting to see the auditors statements on public financial results this year.

I fully expect companies to dress up their results for this quarter. So it will be very interesting to see which companies have audit notes for non-compliance to AS 30. And where AS 30 has been used, to find out the extent of MTM losses.

The End Of The Road For Ambac and MBIA?

2 comments Written on March 30th, 2008 by
Categories: Commentary
This is a non-India post. But it has some significance to the Indian markets. Ambac and MBIA are bond insurers in the US - called "monolines" (though they do work with multiple lines of business now).

These guys insure municipal bonds. That's an organised crime by itself, something that unravelled after the S&L failures in the early 90s. The funda is: municipalities issue bonds to raise funds. School systems, road development authorities, states and city councils etc. Some of htem have "failed" earlier - i.e. they had to default on the bonds because they couldn't collect taxes or had a tough situation.

The bonds therefore seem to have a "risk", and monolines provide insurance on default (on both principal and interest).

But is it really risky? Of course not, a Moody's study found only 41 defaults in 37 years. Not quite enough to be called "lots of risk".

So why the insurance? This is the big insurance scam. The risk is defined by a rating - where AAA is practically no risk (don't laugh), AA is little teeny weeny bit risk, and BBB- is junk. The three big rating agencies - who literally own the rating industry - are Moody's, S&P and Fitch.

These guys (the rating agencies) get their biggest business from the monolines. If they rate the municipal bonds AAA, the bond issuers (the municipalities or school systems or whatever) will not buy bond insurance from the monolines. (Why buy insurance when there is no or low risk of default?). The monolines will then cut the rating agencies' business as a revenge or as it's known in business, quid pro quo.

So the rating agencies keep the municipal bond ratings low, so that the issuer of bonds will buy bond insurance and keep the system running. But that not only drives costs up, it also raises interest rates - a bond rated AA has to pay more than a bond rated AAA and so on.

But the underlying bonds are very safe in reality. Some of them get federal guarantees, some others are guaranteed via letters of credit from pension funds and state funds. That should give them a AAA rating, but the rating agencies don't want to rock the boat.

So 15 states have revolted against the big rating and bond insurance game. They want their ratings to be top-notch and rated exactly like corporations are rated, which is likely to give most of the bonds a AAA rating, and therefore no insurance requirement. (Note that the muni rating process seems to be different from the way corporate bonds are rated, and even Moody's has admitted that should they rate muni's the same way corps are rated, most muni's are likely to be AAA)

Giving muni bonds AAA ratings is a problem. So serious it will kill the bond insurers. Ambac and MBIA have had phenomenal losses in the subprime crisis, because they also insured subprime mortgages and CDOs. They still have a AAA rating from two of the three rating agencies even though they are far closer to insolvency than any of the municipal bond issuers! (Due to the you-scratch-my-back-i-scratch-yours between rating agencies and monolines)

If you take away their bond insurance income, (billions of dollars a year) the monolines would be insolvent very very soon.

The states can squeeze them now, because bonds and short term debt is being priced high, as if there was no insurance. (partly because no one believes Ambac and MBIA are solvent enough to pay on default) Some ports had to pay as much as 20% annualised, to roll over extremely short term debt. (Read this)

Apart from that, the subprime problem is huge. Read this presentation to see how horrible the situation is - there are a HUGE number of defaults waiting to happen in the next few months, and that alone may wipe out all the capital of MBIA and Ambac. Even after fresh capital raising efforts and all that.

What's in it for us in India? Complex fundas but here goes: Ambac and MBIA are counterparties to hajaar MBS and CDOs held by hedge funds, pension funds and investment banks like Citibank, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers etc. These entities have assumed that their CDO insurance would pay against default, but that is not going to happen if the monolines go bankrupt. Goldman actually recorded about $11 billion of profit last quarter, some of it on the mark-to-market price of the CDS they own. (The CDS may be priced high now, but is toilet paper if backed by a bankrupt company on the other side)

So if the monolines go under, a huge number of other entities will end up with massive losses. (They already have big losses, but they countered those with the profits made on this "insurance") Many of these entities invest in India, directly or indirectly.

The Indian market will see massive cash-outs if this situation pans out. Hedge funds, investment banks and pensions are going to take out whatever little profit they have, to balance their other losses, and we will be in the next storm.

This situation is now looking increasingly likely within the next year. It will take the market deeply down, and at any sign of this happening, I would take all my long positions out. But watch first, it could take months before the first signs emerge.

Inflation at 6.68%

2 comments Written on March 28th, 2008 by
Categories: Commentary
The latest weekly release of the WPI Index, according to the Economic Times, is at 6.68%. This is the highest we've seen for a while.

High inflation is a big election problem and the only way to counter it is high interest rates. We already have high interest rates. Will the RBI increase them further?

Also it could reduce the money supply in the country, if the inflation is a function of greater money supply. But it seems like there may actually be less of that as foreign investors take money out of the country. Though to be honest I have no idea what the money supply statistics are, and if the RBI has the ability to control it. (If it has to absorb the money by issuing bonds, it will increase govt. debt and such factors that I cannot even begin to imagine.)

The other thing the government can do is to curb speculation. Commodity prices contribute to the WPI, which determines the WPI inflation - and if they banned trading of certain commodities the govt. will "appear" to have controlled inflation. In reality all that does is to create a grey market for the same goods, because who will sell to the government for cheaper when someone is willing to pay more? A ban is stupid, but a choice between smart and "appear good to the common man" always yields the latter, from our political history.

Still a commodity trading ban will affect not just farmers but also anyone else that is using or selling the commodity, including listed companies. Watch this space.

Is this a one time thing? Last year, at this time, WPI inflation was over 6%. Meaning we don't have a "low base effect". Two weeks more and we should see a trend. If the prices dip back we have no problem.

I'm seeing a lot of TV and media interest in the price rise - alu, pyaaz and all that. That's a bad sign - in this day of yellow journalism, the media doesn't usually go behind important topics like inflation when they have other fascinating stories like how Aishwarya Rai refused Will Smith, how Dhoni has been seen with Bipasha Basu and so on. So when they focus on inflation you know that it has become serious.

Inflation by itself isn't so bad for the stock market investor. It's the impact of measures to CURB inflation that can affect your investment.

Teledata – Proves my low P/E idea wrong!

2 comments Written on March 28th, 2008 by
Categories: Stocks
A reader commented on my Mudra post:
Deepak..nice analysis. I remember your succesful calls like BHEL and after a long, long time, you have given a stock idea. What is important is that - low p/e, growth, cash - all these are there for dime a dozen shares in BSE. for eg,.the above given Teledata, I had to exit at 17, after buying at 60. The problem seems to be - since the list of low p/e, decent growth stocks are high, we have to pick winners - given our limited capital. I don't have Bufffet style capital, obviosuly and I can not spread. Given that and also the fact that mid caps and small caps take 3 times the time to bounce, as opposed to large - I feel that Mudra 3 year time frame is realistic. But believe me, there are dozens out there of this nature and I will be interested in far more exciting ones than Mudra, where the visibility is till low.
Teledata is interesting. The company quoted at a very low P/E, at Rs. 60 or so, in November 2007. Since then it has demerged the marine, technology and shipping operations into separate businesses, for which existing shareholders have been given shares. The base teledata share is now quoting at Rs. 19. This, for a company that has done Rs. 4.7 on EPS last quarter. That's a P/E of less than 2 annualised.

Now these demerged entities are yet to be listed, and only on their listing will we find out how much value was lost in the process. The idea was that each shareholder of Teledata got 1 share of the demerged entities for every two shares they held. (Sirius and Teledata Marine will be merged) So the two new entities must list for a total of Rs. 80 together to make up the difference.

There have been questions about the management and also that operators run this stock, which is why it seems to have run so low. Quality of management is important to understand how companies are valued - the more transparent and open they are, the better the valuation. I don't have any personal experience with the management but there is some fear that they owned a very small percentage (<15%) which may correct to a higher value as the demerger progresses. (Already Teledata shows a 25% promoter ownership).

Other issues: Low dividend (50 paise per share for a high earning.) They use the money for acquisitions of which there are quite a few in the recent past. These acquisitions have been EPS accretive, but the P/E has contracted.

There are some repeated auditor notes on taxes not being deducted or accounted for, about them booking sales when only agents have purchased (i.e. agents could return them and reverse the entry) but management says that is the way it is and no returns will be accepted. I doubt that is true, so there is some danger here.

EPS growth is not huge - but still around 10-20% at this point. And they have a huge number of GDRs out there, and are out to dilute another 500 cr. through QIP/FCCBs. This may be a price trigger.

After all this analysis - what do we have? A growing company with lots of profits, yet being valued at lower P/E as time goes by! It shows that buying purely on P/E can be very very wrong. My Mudra idea wasn't a pure P/E post but I had mentioned that I didn't quite see the risk of further P/E contraction. But looking at Teledata it is indeed possible for a low P/E to become EVEN lower!

That is a risk with Mudra, but I think it's in a slightly different league and doesn't have the management issues or accounting issues that seem to be a problem with Teledata. The risk remains though, and Teledata is one stock where there is a serious problem with pricing. Let their demerged entities list and we will see exactly how much further the P/E has contracted - hopefully there will be more clarity in the value there. What if, after demerging, value is "unlocked" in the subsediaries? It might actually be profitable for the people who held before the demerger.

In all the conclusion is - don't go on P/E alone. Lots of factors may contribute to the price of a share and you shouldn't jump on "undervalued" without going through all the various options available. I will list the options in a separate post.

KS Oils buys 50,000 acres of palm plantation in Indonesia

8 comments Written on March 26th, 2008 by
Categories: KSOILS, Stocks
KS Oils, a company I talked about as having huge insider trades ("Insiders Buy The Big Dip"), has just acquired 50,000 acres of palm plantations in Indonesia.

They will invest Rs. 230 cr. for this, over three years. Not huge, considering they will make sales of 1600 cr. for the year and a profit of 110 cr. or so (likely).

This should ensure lower supply cost. At commodity costs today palm oil is expensive, and margins will stay low if the prices continue to rise. KS Oils currently imports nearly all its oil. The plantation's yield of 80,000 MT is about 2.5% of India's oil imports, which is quite impressive then as an acquisition.

Additionally, duties on palm oil have been slashed recently, giving a higher edge. The acquisition should yield returns after around three years.

Ok so 1) Insider buying and 2) Acquisition. Anything else? 3) Institutional interest. Lot of institutional buying has happened in the stock, but at low prices. Don't know what to make of that, yet. And 4) Power: They have a power division that gets money from Wind Energy.

Negatives: Input prices will stay high until the commodity cycle reverses. I also don't understand the business, and it makes very small margins (<10%). All technicals are negative - MACD, moving averages, Relative Strength etc. There may be a better price point available. P/E still at 15 or so, which is not "value". (Though EPS growth is nearly 25%)

Disclosure: No positions. This may be a time for bargain hunters but this is not a bargain at this price. A bargain would be Rs. 40. But it is a momentum story, and if it needs to be picked up, the technicals should show signs, not just the (already sound) fundamentals.

Mudra Lifestyle – Stock Idea

30 comments Written on March 24th, 2008 by
Categories: Commentary, Mudra
After a long time I've found something worth buying. A company with a 3.9 P/E is very interesting, though there are risks. But note that I am the kind of guy who is willing to lose money so if you want a "safe" investment please consider a fixed deposit instead.

So Mudra Lifestyle is a garment manufacturer that has been beaten down to death, or nearly so. At the current price of Rs. 36.1, the company quotes at a P/E of around 4. But why is this company interesting?

Solid growth: EPS on 06-07 was about 6.3. The EPS in the first nine months of 07-08 is already Rs. 6.5, and probably will reach Rs. 9 for the year. They announced in December of a 35 crore order set to be completed in four months, that might be accounted for in the current quarter or the next. On an equity of 3.6 cr. shares, and average margins of 10-12%, this set of orders itself should yield a Rs. 1 EPS.

Promoter Interest: The promoters have just been granted 30 lakh warrants at Rs. 120 per share. Remember that the IPO was at Rs. 80 and the price has been to about 110 since then, but the promoters still decided to take on warrants at a high price. The warrants themselves will yield Rs. 36 cr. when subscribed to. Additionally, the company secretary and CFO have bought shares in the market, and have not sold.

Lower than book value: According to some sites, the book value of Mudra is Rs. 80 per share. While I don't know if this plays a part in this kind of business (of custom orders etc.) it is a good metric to know that if the business goes bankrupt today you can get more than the share price by selling assets. At least in theory! In practise this is not a fantastic metric, but I have seen how it has really boomed in the case of Sintex, another textile play. Sintex, in 2003 was quoting at Rs. 75 (Rs. 15 after adjusting for splits) which was below its book value. After being beaten up a lot, it is at Rs. 300 today, a 2000% return in four years! (and it was Rs. 500 recently)

Cashola: Yes, this company seems to have oodles of cash. They have used just 9 cr. of the 86 cr. IPO proceeds, all towards expenses. (You see how Investment bankers get rich? More than 10% of the issue!) They currently have 83 cr.in the bank according to their Jan announcement. That itself is a good Rs. 23 per share.

So what I would pay for this business is the price of Rs. 36, of which Rs. 23 is cash. They do have Rs. 71 cr. of loans, but most of that has assets behind it. At a P/E of 4 I am not quite afraid of P/E contraction, and the company is growing at around 33% on EPS.

There must be something wrong though. What?

The textile industry has been hosed nearly all of last year, with the declining dollar. Mudra isn't so reliant on exports so it is less affected, and it may be the white knight of the sector. Still, the sector has been impacted much, and perhaps there will be news we haven't yet heard about. At a P/E of 4, I would need Mudra's growth to reverse massively to make an impact - I don't quite see that as a huge risk right now.

I do not know if there are other risks like currency risk, derivative risk etc. But I can't predict all of that right now, we have to work with what is known.

Overall world slowdown is a concern, but the cash base allows it to make acquisitions and grow in turbulent times. Having a cushion is important.

Finally the concern is that the market will never recognise this as a good buy. There isn't much institutional interest, with no mutual funds holding it and some FIIs only (about 10% being held by institutions). But that just means it's undiscovered, and I am happy to take the risk earlier.

This is a downright buy for me. I am holding for a 100% return within three years. Why three? Because the current market conditions don't allow a one year story. If I do my 100% earlier I might exit. My stop loss is a further 25% down from here, at Rs. 27.

Disclosure: I own this stock, it is about 10% of my portfolio now. (Why would I write all this about a stock and not buy it?)

Insiders Buying The Big Dip

6 comments Written on March 21st, 2008 by
Categories: Commentary, IncomeTax, KSOILS
Corporate India is betting on itself. The level of insider buying has reached dizzying heights in the last two months, with more than 20 announcements a day. Insider trading regulations require that promoters tell the exchange when they buy or sell shares, even if they buy 1 more share. Prominent insider buying noted in:

KS Oils: Ramesh Chand Garg, a promoter and chairman of the oil manufacturer, has bought nearly 4% of the company since Jan 2008, spending nearly 80 cr. according to my calculations. The price is at Rs. 62 or such, P/E around 15.

IndiaBulls: The brokerage and financial service provider has been hit hard, falling to Rs. 388 from 1,000 in Jan. Saurabh Mittal, Sameer Gehlaut and Rajiv Rattan, the three founders, have bought a HUGE number of shares since Jan, and my conservative calculations show they have put in nearly 300 cr. altogether in buying shares from the Market, since Jan. The P/E is around 14-16 on a trailing basis.

Man Industries: Ramesh Mansukhani has bought shares little by little, bit by bit. I haven't calculated how much - this is probably not more than 20 crores - but it's good to see. The share is at Rs. 108, P/E around 7.5.

Apart from these, REL is buying back shares (price of 1600 max), lots of small company directors are buying (but very small amounts). At Moneyoga we're trying to get this all together so we can see significant purchases over a period of time.

Some information may be misleading - for instance Deepak Parekh of HDFC sold about 15 crore worth shares recently, but it looks like that is just an FBT offsetting transaction (he got shares worth nearly 50 cr. as ESOPs, for which he would be liable for FBT). But it's interesting all the same.