Archive for September, 2008

Funny-mentals : Tata Steel

4 comments Written on September 27th, 2008 by
Categories: Funnymentals, TataSteel
I got a mail from Ninad today about how Tata Steels standalone figures had an EPS of Rs. 18, but the consolidated figures including Corus, were released later and found to be Rs. 47 per share.

A little bit of research happened, and I found there's a huge wool pulling scene happening - very interestingly, all legal, so I have decided to open a thread to solve this puzzle.

At a quarterly consolidated EPS of Rs. 47, up from Rs. 36 last year, this is a damn good buy at Rs. 460, no? Heck, that translates to a P/E of 2! For a company growing at 20%! I'm wetting my trousers at the prospect!

Not really. Turns out the auditors have added a tiny little tidbit to the results:

The consolidated financial results include the consolidated financial results of Tata Steel UK Ltd and its subsidiaries whose income constitutes 74% of the consolidated total income. In UK, the pension liability of Tata Steel UK is computed and accounted for in accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards. IFRS permit the impact of changes in the assets and liabilities due to assumptions of variables like bond yield rates, discount rates, inflation and demographic assumptions to be accounted for in “Reserves & Surplus”. This practice is consistently followed by Tata Steel UK. The Indian Accounting Standard (AS15) is different from the above and requires such changes to be accounted for in the profit & loss account. Given the large share of Tata Steel UK in the consolidated Tata Steel results, and the potential volatility caused by periodic changes in the assumptions underlying the computation of the pension liabilities, it is not considered practicable to adopt a common accounting policy for accounting for the pension liability of the Company and Tata Steel UK Ltd. During the current quarter, the pension funds of Tata Steel UK, with asset base of around £ 14 bn (Rs. 120,000 crores approx), have shown a reduction in the funds’ surplus by around £ 648 million (Rs.5,352 crores). This has been accounted in “Reserves and Surplus” in the consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS principles and permitted by AS21. This treatment is consistent with the accounting principles followed by Tata Steel UK and earlier by Corus Group plc. under IFRS. Had the company followed the previous practice of recognising changes in actuarial valuations of pension plans of Tata Steel UK, in the profit and loss account, the profit from ordinary activities after exceptional items and before tax for the current quarter would have been lower by Rs. 5,352 crores.

The financial results for the quarter ended June 30, 2008 and the pro-forma results for the previous periods have been prepared taking into account the above practice.

Uhem. I don't like it when companies SUDDENLY change accounting practices, so I decided to venture a little further.

So this pension fund has some gains or losses based on interest rate changes, bond yields etc. This is required by Indian law to be reported in the P&L. Last year Tisco took it all into the P&L - a whopping 5900 crores. That was added to the consolidated PAT, and that figure gives a huge Rs. 162 per share EPS. (which is also weird, I'll come to that).

So when it added a whopping 5900 cr. it was perfectly fine to take it on their P&L, but when it showed a loss - and that too at 5,500 cr. loss - they refuse to take it on.

So technically, if the laws were followed exactly as they were last year, Tata Steel would report a LOSS for this quarter.

I then said heck, ok, this is still only actuarial gain, but something's funny in the calculations. So in the annual financials, they have this bit:

They have 73 cr. shares. They have an actuarial gain (let's ignore the rest) of Rs. 5906 cr. The actuarial gain is non taxable so take the PAT - 12,321 cr. Subtract the 5907 cr. - you will get 6,415 cr.

Let's assume zero dilution - at 6,415 cr. with 73 cr. shares, the EPS after exceptional items should be at Rs. 87.88. The dilution should take it even lower, one thinks?

So their diluted EPS report is wrong. Ok, big deal. Even in the latest results they restate earlier data without the actuarial gain and show a diluted EPS of 91.44. It takes around 80 cr. shares duly diluted, but that's a little off.

And they take forex losses as exceptional items (which is weird, because it's setup to offset current costs, so it's by no means "exceptional"). Such losses are technically operational - they are hedges. So are gains, btw, so I'm not one sided on this.

Ok now, how much dilution are we likely to see?

Two levels:

  • Some 8 cr. more shares have been issued as convertible preference shares. These will be converted.
  • Some 875 million $ shares are issued as foreign currency convertibles - but they haven't been hedged. (so there's a loss there coming up but that's different funda). Okay, so this converts at 758 per share - a value unlikely to be reached in the near future, given current rates are 460. The debt if not converted is nearly 5,000 cr. - not sure if that is added to the debt column (it will increase interest costs) - and if it is converted, will dilute by about 6 cr. shares. (This might already be converted, I don't know)
That should yield about 14 cr. shares extra. Look at this report from Emkay Research. It assumes an 87 cr. fully diluted equity base - which means I'm close (at least to someone else's calculations).

At 87 cr. shares the fully diluted EPS should be even lower than at 73 cr. shares, no? So last year's EPS figure will be about Rs. 73, consolidated.

The first quarter of FY 09 seems to have been good - they earned more than 5000 cr. of profit from operations. But steel prices are off more than 30% since then. And capital has been tight - so surely impact of that on interest paid will be visible. Will profits drop dramatically? Will these actuarial gains be taken back into P&L if they turn positive? Will the FCCBs be converted? Will preference share dilution impact be taken into consideration?

Such complex questions - and no real answers. At one end you may end up with a P/E of 2. At the other, a P/E of 10.

But the stock price at 460 has been seriously weak.

Here's where I think I must stop believing in reported numbers. I will reject all the bull that that management will throw at me - heck, I could come up with at least three different diluted EPS figures based on my mood at the time. I'll stop believing in reports - who cares if the numbers themselves may be wrong, and seriously wrong. Perhaps the only thing I can trust is price. If the price is falling, something is wrong, and if it's rising something is right. Forget why. It doesn't matter.

No wonder Ed Seykota called them "funny-mentals". I will now keep posts tagged that way - all these funny weird looking things will be noted as Funnymentals.

Now, Would I short Tisco? Fundamentally I might not - because it looks cheap, etc. But that's funnymentals. If there ever was a clear downtrend, this is it. In four months it's fallen from 900 to 460. It's invitation to short - and perhaps belongs somewhere in the SoS. Have to do some more analysis.

On another note: My April 2007 post on the corus buyout seems to be interesting - I was so wrong and stupid. The price I said would happen in October 2007 - 430 to 440 - is close only in September 2008.

Nifty Index EPS growth in Q2 2008-09

2 comments Written on September 27th, 2008 by
Categories: Commentary
I want to look into the October results season and see what the results may bring to us. It's not good and I know I sound depressing but its better to get depressed now than disappointed later.

How are we going to fare going forward, with a worldwide recession at a minimum and a severe depression at the other end? The Nifty consists of various kinds of stocks and let's see the outlook for them all.

  • Oil (26% weight): Outlook is bleak only because oil prices are coming down, and so are refining margins. The refiners will make further lower margins as demand of products (petrol/diesel/etc) come down because of lowered demand in recessions. Some of these companies have huge FCCB loans, which will have to either dilute the stock or be paid at a much higher dollar value, hitting the bottomline. Lastly the oil finds of recent times will need money to explore and exploit - money that isn't going to be easily available. Earnings growth should come down dramatically - from 15% average last quarter to perhaps 5 or so.
  • Power and Power Equipment (14.5%): Power is a regulated sector so the plants will have limited profitability. Till now, the equipment vendors have been able to finance and grow customers easily. But going forward, money is less likely to flow into this capital hungry sector - mostly because of lack of available money. So power plants that are "planned" stay on the drawing board, while others cut their aggressive growth plans. That, and again a high ECB/FCCB exposure with a dollar impact, hurts them in the coming quarters.

    The last quarter these guys announced a -18% EPS growth, on average. This time it is likely to be the same or worse. Note here: EPS will dip.

  • Financials (11.36%) - Last quarter they grew -1% on EPS. This quarter will see capital write-downs through sales of ABS, or derivatives, effectively booking the loss. NPAs aren't likely to contract - chances are that they will increase. Plus, bond portfolios will see mark-to-market losses as rates have been increased. I would not be surprised to see a further 1-2% EPS contraction.
  • IT (11%): While some companies like Satyam may have some losses with deals with financials, the overall growth is likely to be decent. Rupee's down a lot, and while they would've all hedged, some did take out part of their hedges. The growth was 26% average last quarter (not considering HCL Tech) which I think may pare down to 20%.

    But the problem is the outlook. These guys provide a lot of services to bank and financial service companies abroad. Some of which may not survive the year. And the rest will cut spending like crazy.

  • Telecom (10.3%): Should have done well. But there's this whole external borrowing thing that's very weird, and if accounted properly, might cut dramatically into profits. Either ways I expect about 15% EPS growth on average.
  • Realty, Cement (totally 6%) - Ok this bit is hosed, and I don't expect anything good out of this. Last quarter cement was down 18% on EPS, and Realty up 13% - this time I expect both down about 20% each. Realty has a weirdo accounting logic so what it really is may not be what is shown to us.
  • Auto, FMCG (6%) - Probably will keep EPS stable. Means 0% EPS growth, according to me.
  • The rest: There's Pharma, which will get hosed with FCCB but should be defensive otherwise. There's Zee, the only media company, which I have zero opinion about. There's L&T which has a reasonable order book but gets tied down with its dollar exposure (though it's the only company I have a positive outlook on).
Overall I think we'll grow Nifty EPS by even lesser than the 10% we did last quarter. And the Nifty P/E is still 17+. That means the EPS is about 235. A 10 P/E then should mean...well, let's not even go there.

Remember that this is all "funny-mentals". There is very little "value" to this information - that is, very little tradeable value, because you never know what will happen, and my assessment is just my opinion. In fact it may be so that I end up being long on the market - because in such markets you change your opinion every day, if not every hour.

While you can't use this info to dictate price, it's interesting that the fundamentals back up the fall in the indices. It's not just an arbitrary fall, like in 2006. It's not an event driven fall like in 2004. This is a huge, massive, bear market. The end is not near, and it's not even the beginning of the end for us in India.

Our news flow, when it comes, will be very bad for the markets. Some of you are thinking: what can be worse than this? One or two days of big deep falls are actually a good time - because you can act. What is worse is 6 months when the index moves, literally, 10 points a day, and mostly down. People lose interest. Nobody "books" their losses - they simply forget they had ever invested. There are no buyers for even the midcaps, and no sellers either, so the market is in some drug-induced stupor.

That's much much worse than this. Imagine two years of say a -10% growth. Nothing scary, nothing to cheer about either. I'm hoping an automated system will do well - we'll see.

What happens to WaMu CDS?

No Comments » Written on September 26th, 2008 by
Categories: Crisis2008
So Washington Mutual goes belly up. JP Morgan acquires its assets. Meaning, depositors are safe - JPM guarantees them. Loans from WaMu will now be paid to JPM.

But it has a hugely negative effect on liabilities - meaning, people who are owed money by WaMu. Shares are going to zero of course. But so are bondholders, senior or subordinated, and preferred if any

WaMu had a ton of CDS on it - trading at high prices, but not quite at 100% so what happens? The CDS writers will have to pay. And pay big.

AIG went belly up after Lehman - I don't know if that is correlative but AIG did have a lot of CDS on LEH.

Who has a lot of CDS exposure to WaMu? We won't know as of now because this stuff is OTC, traded in secret. Damn, why aren't these things exchange traded? All this will do is create panic. No one knows, and information asymmetry means people will back off.

This is going to be bad for the likes of Ambac and MBIA who are known to do CDS deals. And bad, perhaps, for every other bank in town just as a consequence. This "bailout" business - it does nothing to address that. More drama. Coming soon, to a news channel near you.

SoS Update: 6% up, closed Unitech/JP, shorted Nifty calls

2 comments Written on September 25th, 2008 by
Categories: ShortOnly
Today was expiry so some updates:
  • Closed Unitech position at 130.3. This results in a virtual net profit (from the first trade) of about 1.2 lakh after brokerage, rollover costs etc. I am not rolling this over - this has been a ridiculously successful trade and I think Unitech may have positive news flow in the short term. Also, there may be better avenues to deploy short capital.
  • Close JP Associates position at 123.5. From opening at 157.2 this trade resulted in a virtual profit of about Rs. 1 lakh. Again, I'm not rolling this over right away; I think it's done a very fast move, and I might reinitiate after the US bailout plan is revealed.
  • I've rolled over half the ICICI short, but closed the rest, as again, I don't know about the US bailout situation - we might come into a better position to short later.
  • Closed Nifty future trade at a profit of about Rs. 32,000.
  • Shorted 600 Nifty 4100 call options at 209 each. My deal is that I need some capital to be employed; but I don't want to risk it in a future - a short call gives some level of cover (remember, no leverage).
Here's the status:

About 6% profit in about 1.5 months, with less than 60% capital employed at any given time (gives one a cushion). This is all virtual - if it was real I wouldn't be talking about it. Not bad for a month but I must see how this does in an uptrend, shouldn't lose all the profits! So too early to call.

Disclosure: No positions. Standard fundas apply - this is not advice, it's education, and it's not meant to have anyone trade it with real money. Please don't do this because I'm saying something.

Mark-To-Paulson – A game with loaded dice

1 Comment » Written on September 25th, 2008 by
Categories: Crisis2008
Jonathan Weil thinks there's more to this deal - in terms of a mark-to-market scandal. See "Why Mark-to-Paulson Accounting won't save banks":
The plan goes like this: Treasury will pay financial institutions above-market prices for garbage assets nobody else wants. Then, through the magic of mark-to-Paulson accounting, everybody else that owns similar stuff will use those same prices, or marks, to value the trash on their own balance sheets.

Shazam! Banks and insurance companies write up the asset values on their books. They post big profits. Their capital goes up. Everyone gets fooled. And nobody knows the difference.

So Weil says that while it sounds like that - the plan gets derailed just because we know about the plan. And the brouhaha about using reverse auctions to "discover" prices for illiquid assets, isn't likely to work.
Under Paulson's plan, Treasury would hold so-called reverse auctions for financial institutions' troubled assets. Whoever submits the lowest bid gets to sell its junky assets to Treasury for cash.

While that might look like a competitive, free-market mechanism, it's not. Once the first bid in the first auction is submitted, it may not go much lower, and it probably will be much higher than the true market value.

That's because the real incentive for the banks isn't to sell their rubbish to Treasury and get cash. It's to watch the Treasury pay grossly inflated prices to others. That way, they can use those transactions for accounting purposes to mark their books to the Treasury's farcical market prices.

Effectively - all the banks need is a better mark-to-market price to be able to have lower writedowns and in some cases, write-ups!

Why should the treasury spend $700 billion then - might as well spend a couple million, put up a few prices, and then tell everyone - forget marking to market, you can mark to Paulson instead.

And interestingly enough, when people know about this kind of rigmarole, how will it work?

I am now slowly coming to think that perhaps this bill isn't going to be passed very soon.

It’s the Rating Agencies.

No Comments » Written on September 24th, 2008 by
Categories: Crisis2008
Bloomberg has an interesting article on how rating agencies did a considerable amount of damage by not being quite honest with rating, creating the current crisis.
Relying on a competitor's analysis was one of a series of shortcuts that undermined credit grades issued by S&P and rival Moody's Corp., according to Raiter. Flawed AAA ratings on mortgage-backed securities that turned to junk now lie at the root of the world financial system's biggest crisis since the Great Depression, according to Raiter and more than 50 former ratings professionals, investment bankers, academics and consultants.

"I view the ratings agencies as one of the key culprits," says Joseph Stiglitz, 65, the Nobel laureate economist at Columbia University in New York. "They were the party that performed that alchemy that converted the securities from F- rated to A-rated. The banks could not have done what they did without the complicity of the ratings agencies."

The rating agencies - S&P, Moody's and Fitch at the top end - are supposed to be honest. But they will defend themselves saying they only provide an opinion - which is protected by the first amendment.

Yet, their rating is important in a number of cases - putting up collateral, or finding funding, or debt insurance and even mandatory minimums for public funds. They are not only opinion, they influence a lot of capital. A very strict regulatory regime is required - that they demonstrate their research into ratings, the amount of money they earn, the way they deduce the rating and how they track every factor. Either ratings must be standardised across industries, municipalities etc. or there should be a complete ban on linking any capital (collateral, interest rate etc.) to a rating. And then anyone should be able to rate - i.e. the data used to rate must be made completely public. So if some rating agency decides to independently rate something they must have complete access.

This will kill the business. And this business, as it's run today, needs to die. They have lost our trust. From now on, we should be free to ignore them.

Still, they were only part of the problem. This was bank greed, lack of regulation, homeowner greed etc. which were as guilty. The problem wasn't only the rating - the problem was that we trusted a rating, that we based decisions on it. Even that has got to change.

Buffett gets in; Goldman Sachs is the bet

9 comments Written on September 24th, 2008 by
Categories: Buffett, Crisis2008
Warren Buffett is now officially in. The grand old man of value investing has just pumped in $5 billion into Goldman Sachs. Obviously this is viewed on the street as a sign of "confidence" in the system. Big Picture begs to differ.
Vote of confidence? Hardly. Doubtful. It is merely an opportunistic deal, and probably a damn good one, for Berkshire Hathaway (BRK). On the other hand, for Goldman Sachs, it is a very expensive deal. If you delve beneath the headlines, you see that Warren is not so much making a vote of confidence as he is extracting pound of flesh (and then some).
Read the whole thing. In effect, Berkshire gets $5 billion worth preferred shares - with a 10% payout on them, which is $500 million a year. He can ask for it back at 10% premium whenever he wants. Goldman can ditch Buffett at a 10% premium (changed, thanks Dheeraj), a perpetual 10% cost. Then he gets warrants (call options) for $5 billion worth GS stock at $115 per share. For no extra money down.

Obviously if Paulson doesn't rescue the banks GS may not have that kind of upside, and this kind of liability might take it down further. Uhm, Buffett kinda expects it: (Via Calculated Risk)

"If I didn't think the government was going to act I wouldn't have done anything," Bufett said Wednesday during a wide-ranging interview with CNBC Television.
Not quite the vote of confidence in Goldman Sachs, you'd think. But Buffett is going to need to put more capital in. He has big investments in housing (interiors etc.), financial services, rating agencies and insurance - the future of which aren't looking very good. If he doesn't participate now, there will be other repercussions - especially when some of these industries are going to face severe regulation.

But this is a smart cookie deal. He loses only if the U.S. economy tanks. What are the chances of that? Why don't I hear a loud "NONE"?

Rescuing My Golfing Buddies

1 Comment » Written on September 23rd, 2008 by
Categories: Crisis2008
So how does this work? (Ben Bernanke talking)
I believe that under the Treasury program, auctions and other mechanisms could be devised that will give the market good information on what the hold-to-maturity price is for a large class of mortgage-related assets. If the Treasury bids for and then buys assets at a price close to the hold-to-maturity price, there will be substantial benefits.
Good commentary on this by Calculated Risk, Henry Blodget and Paul Krugman.

"Hold-to-maturity" = price I would pay using some excel based calculation like PV or something, using an interest rate, remaining principal and time left on the mortgage.

This does not account for risk that the mortgage will default.

If the Treasury pays hold-to-maturity prices they will overpay, significantly, than market - which has perhaps priced in too much risk, but not by far. The prices are low because there is tremendous risk in there. And the treasury does nothing to mitigate that risk.

In current form, the banks get paid full value, and all the risk is with Treasury (meaning: Taxpayer). Very bad for America. Very good for top management of bank.

Like people argue, the Swedish bank bailout - which told banks to take the write downs and capitalized the banks on the loss, taking equity - is a better deal. But Paulson and Bernanke won't hear of it. They won't have too many people to play golf with, if they did.