Archive for February, 2009

Bad News For the Week

5 comments Written on February 27th, 2009 by
Categories: Uncategorized
A lot of consolidation from Twitter but here goes. Let's just look at the bad news of this week.

US News

US Unemployment initial claims at 667K, up 36K week-on-week, and a 39 year high. 5.11 million on the continued claims list, again an all time high. But since the number of people in the US have increased, this is not quite up there as the highest unemployment rate. Still, little satisfaction.

Existing home sales are at 4.9m seasonally adjusted, down 8.6% year-on-year. This is about 9.6 months of supply at current offtake levels. New home sales at 309K adjusted, lowest since 1963. That's nearly 24 months of supply at current rates - and "normal" should be around 6-8 months. So if there is no fresh inventory coming in, we'll be back to life in 1.5 years.

High hopes - unless transactions increase, this data is not going to help - need to see more houses selling, at lower prices, for a recovery to begin.

And this inventory does not include foreclosed home that may have been held back as the banks can't afford to flood the market - not that this is happening, but it seems people are referring to it.

US GDP shrunk 6.2% in Oct-Dec 2008, much worse than expected. The US is taking a huge stake in Citibank, probably upto 75% - I'm still not clear about the exact figure - to ensure it stays alive.

India News

GDP grew "only" 5.3% in Q3, a far cry from the sizzling 8.9% a year back. On a nine month basis, our GDP grew 6.9% versus 9% a year back. Not bad at all, but the growth has come tremendously from Construction, Trade, Finance/Real Estate (Agriculture and Manufacturing are in fact contracting). How much of that do you see GROWING this year?

Bond yields contracted to around 6.34%. It's likely that falling inflation and a slowing economy will let the RBI bring rates down.

The US dollar/rupee rate went to 50.69, a high, and then slid back down to under 50. People say that rates cannot be decreased because the rupee is sliding - but look at the system; Foreign entities have literally maxed their limits of g-sec buying (corp bond buying has been upped too) so they seem to be happy to invest and we should open that window further. RBI can sell our dollars heavily, use the money to buy bonds in the market to cut yields further, so issuances will not be a big problem. Recently an auction of g-secs failed and dealers had to pick it up - it didn't fail for any good reason, as the cutoff yield was 6.98%, and the bonds never even went there; as I said, I believe the market is manipulated by the few people that are allowed to participate.

Note here that our stock markets have been wonky throughout last week, but have been showing some strength in the later parts of the day. But volumes, my goodness, volumes. We see less than 7000 cr. a day - except expiry day on Feb 26 when we saw 9000 cr. - that's so low! We used to do 20K cr. in the cash market! Now we're back to 2006 levels. And before it gets better, I believe it will become worse.

That's for a cheerful friday. Now let's watch the US markets react to the Citi and GDP news. Over and out.

SoS: Rollovers, Changes

1 Comment » Written on February 26th, 2009 by
Categories: ShortOnly
For the Short-Only Strategy, a pretty big rollover this time but I've not had to update the sheet. A number of lot sizes have changed as well, must update those and recalculate risk based on it.

What I'll be doing is writing Nifty calls instead of a pure future position.

I'm also getting rid of Bharti, Cairn and ZeeL - they haven't done much. Pantaloon Retail, HDFC and ICICI have done excellently, so they'll stay and have quantities increased a bit.

Reliance - again, writing call options zone for now. Will replace Unitech with another real estate company, details tomorrow.

Additions: Educomp, Tata Motors and a few real estate stocks are candidates. Will post more tomorrow.

Hail the Pension Policy for Making Rating Agencies Irrelevant

7 comments Written on February 25th, 2009 by
Categories: MakeRatingAgenciesIrrelevant, NPS
PFRDA has released the Investment Regulations for the New Pension Scheme for the informal sector (Sorry for the google link, the original link doesn't seem to work anymore).

Update: We have the correct link. Thanks to commenter Chaitanya!

So the Pension scheme, which starts on April 1, will allow everyone to dictate where their pension money is invested, in three areas - "E" being equities (currently Nifty indexed), "G" meaning G-Secs, Liquid funds etc. and "C" being medium risk (Credit risk on fixed income instruments).

What is fantastic in there for "C" is the disregard for Rating agencies completely. I have total disrespect for all the rating agencies: S&P, Moodys and Fitch most of all. S&P has just downgraded India - for heaven's sake, we are nowhere close to Europe, the US or even Citi and GE, but all of those enjoy a better rating? And we should believe them, despite their rating subprime CDOs as AAA even when they were on the verge of default? And after keeping Lehman and Enron's rating right till the time they went bankrupt? C'mon. They are either incompetent or arrogant - whatever it is, let's cut them out. They must be made irrelevant.

That's why I like this part:

3.1.3 Asset class “C”

This last asset class contains bonds issued by any entity other than the Central Government. Here, the issuers can be state governments, municipal bodies, state government PSU/PSE like electricity boards, and private corporations. Unlike with equity, these are fixed income instruments with fixed maturities. The risk of these assets is limited to the default risk of the issuer and is, therefore, more restricted compared to the risk of equity.

However, the risk of default varies widely across issuers. In the early phase of NPS, it would be prudent to consider some restrictions on issuers whose bonds could be part of Asset Class “C”.

Traditionally, investment restrictions have been put in place based on the credit rating of the bond issued. However, while we do consider that there is value in a bond that has a credit rating compared to a bond that does not have a credit rating, the EG does not consider it either necessary nor sufficient to include a minimum credit rating for a bond that NPS funds can be invested into.

There are several reasons for this:

1. Domestic and international events observed over the last decade of financial market activity have given pause to selection criteria based solely on credit ratings. The two main observations are:

  • Credit ratings take a long time to adjust to information present in the market about the credit worthiness of any given bond. Some of the more stark examples of this are that of the credit ratings of Worldcom and Enron. The credit ratings on their bonds adjusted downward far later than the stock prices of their shares.
  • More recent events have shown that credit rating agencies are vulnerable to agency conflicts between the rater and the rated.
The recent crisis of the problems that have arisen in the financial institutions that have led to the global financial crisis is another case in point.

In isolation, such events are not damaging – it is not possible for any financial measure to be perfect predictors of credit quality. However, a sole/primary dependence on credit ratings alone has been shown to be flawed as a strategy in setting investment criteria primarily because of the manner in which it skews the incentive of the PFM.

2. One of the key lessons from the financial sector crisis of the last several years is that if there are strong prudential risk monitoring and management rules, fund man agers tend to obey them blindly at the cost of developing their own internal risk management systems.

Every fund manager has internal prudential investment norms that are set and ap- proved by the board of the AMC. These become the risk-return tradeoffs which become the cornerstone of investment decisions made by the PFMs.

Instead, the EG consider a more broad-based set of selection criteria for credit linked investments. These selection criteria are biased towards liquidity of the instruments and the availability of frequent information updates about the issuer based on which the PFMs can have a more relevant assessment of the credit quality of the bond issuer.

We observe that there is a far larger amount of information that is available about the earnings and performance of bond issuers that also have shares listed and traded on public exchanges. For such issuers, which today include a good representation of public sector enterprises and public sector undertakings (PSE/PSU), fund managers will have access to standardised and audited information. On the other hand, fund managers will not have access to similar kinds of information for those entities which are not listed companies.

This set includes issuers such as state governments, municipalities, as well as most of the infrastructure projects that are available for investment today and, likely in the near future as well.

We recommend that for entities that issue bonds which have better disclosure of balance sheet and performance data, the selection criteria for NPS PFMs to invest in their bonds can be broader based than only credit ratings.

In this, we follow in the footsteps of the credit risk measurement practices that are increasingly gaining credibility all across the world. When prices are available from liquid secondary market trading, credit measures based on this price becomes an indicator of changes in credit quality of the issuer. Such measures lead changes in the traditional credit rating by a wide margin. Thus, fund managers that depend upon price-based measures can adjust for changes in credit quality of the issuer much earlier than fund managers that depend only upon the traditional credit ratings.

The evidence has led to credit ratings models having adopted price based measures to update the credit quality of issuers in their ratings models. As mentioned earlier, the advantage of the stock-price based credit measure is that it is a more real-time measure of the credit worthiness of a bond than the credit rating itself. The caveat to using the credit measure based on stock prices is that the price based information depends upon the liquidity of the stock of the issuer: the more liquid the share, the better the price information as an early and credible indicator of credit quality of the issuer. However, within this caveat, we recognise that prices and the information in listed entities is a valuable source of input for valuation of securities by the PFM. We therefore, recommend that the selection criteria for listed and non-listed entities be differentiated, with a lower emphasis on the credit rating where better information is available.

Recommendation

With the above considerations in mind, we recommend the following as the non-central government entities, whose bonds can be permitted into the Asset Category “C” for NPS investment:

  • All state government bonds that are explicitly guaranteed by the state government.
  • All state government bonds that are rated by a credit rating agency. There is no restriction on an “acceptable minimum” credit quality – the choice of investment is left upto the PFM to decide.
  • All credit rated bonds/securities of
    1. “Public Financial Institutions” as specified under Section 4(A) of the Companies Act, and
    2. “Public sector companies” as defined in Section 2(36-A) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ; the principal whereof and interest whereon is fully and unconditionally guaranteed by the Central Government.
  • All municipal bodies/infrastructure funds bonds that are rated by a credit rating agency. There is no restriction on an “acceptable minimum” credit quality in the case of municipal bonds as well – here too, the investment choice is left to the prudence of the PFM.
  • Bonds be permitted for NPS investment of all firms (including PSU/PSE) that have shares listed on a stock exchange with nation-wide terminals, and:
    1. Have a market capitalisation of over Rs.5000 crore (as on 31st March),
    2. Which have been traded for at least three years,
    3. Whose shares have an average trading frequency of at least 95% for a period of the last one year on the exchange.
    4. Whose top management as well as the board of directors of the company have no legal/regulatory charges against them.

    The stock-market based filters for selection of corporate bonds for NPS “C” asset investment also implies that the stock market indicators can be used for valuation of the “C” assets. This will be an improvement in the current valuation framework that is based on credit-rating downgrade since the stock market price can be a more real-time measure of credit quality compared to the credit rating.

  • In addition, exposure to any single bond of an entity should not exceed more than 5% of the total funds invested by the PFM in Asset Class “C”.
  • The total exposure to bonds by any single entity should not exceed more than 10% of the total funds invested by the PFM in Asset Class “C”.
  • Lastly, the total credit exposure of all the NPS funds invested in the debt of any permitted entity should be limited to a concentration of less than 5% of the total debt of that company.
Emphasis mine.

Now it is likely that these rating agencies, with the power of their money, try to influence the government and the PFRDA to change this. Plus, for pension fund managers, it is a good curtain to hide behind, and say that they invested in something that was rated highly; that absolves them from the responsibility of good credit checks.

I urge you all to support the current proposal - of total irrelevance of a rating. We must remove the concept of rating entirely from legislation - only if someone wants an "opinion" they will look at a rating, it is not a necessary thing; from a regulation standpoint, there should be ZERO reason to pay these incompetent or arrogant people our money.

How to do it? Please mail or contact the PFRDA at their contact page. Best way of action is to mail kamal.chaudhry@pfrda.org.in. If you like, CC me in (deepakshenoy@gmail) and I will collate the response list; just in case the rating agencies create a fuss, we must be united on the other side.

Using our Forex Reserves to Fund Our Fiscal Deficit

4 comments Written on February 24th, 2009 by
Categories: Uncategorized
So, S&P is thinking of downgrading our country based on the increased fiscal deficit and they're hitting our banks too. This gets me really pissed off, because the people they should have downgraded they didn't do until it was too late - Enron, Lehman and the "AAA" safe-tranches of subprime CDOs that collapsed. The sheer arrogance. Oh well, it doesn't matter anyhow. Within a year, all the rating agencies will be irrelevant.

Still, let's look at the deficit. Right now, officially, we're short by about 45,000 cr. The government does not want to borrow from the market, which seems to be a colluding-set-of-banks, keeping prices low and yields high so that the government buckles and they can buy good debt at low prices.

What then, are the choices? We could borrow abroad, or use some other unrequired issuances (like the MSS stabilization pool) But why not use our foreign exchange reserves instead?

We have $230 billion of forex reserves. A significant chunk of these have come from NRI remittances, a lot of which is non-repatriable - i.e. it's converted to rupees and spent here and does not need to be paid back. Another lot from exporters is also not a liability - i.e does not need to be paid back in dollars. Therefore, it's not required to be kept in US dollars - then why not convert the reserves instead, to finance our fiscal deficit?

Right now, all we'll need is about $10 billion - that's about 50,000 cr. Let's just say it gets worse, and we need $30 billion - that's still nothing compared to $230 bn we hold.

And, if you think this will do shady things to our imports - our total oil import bill, at current prices, is likely to be $35-$40 billion. We currently have about 6 YEARS of oil imports (versus the crisis in 1992, when we had 15 days). We don't need 6 years of oil imports in our bank, please.

A quick chat with Ajay Shah, who is far far better at this than I can hope to be, revealed that it's not as simple as selling some dollars and saying "Ho gaya, ab khana kha lo". [I can't translate this]

The RBI balance sheet has this stuff on their asset side. You take away from an asset, you gotta replace it with another asset. In this case the simplest thing to do would be to replace part of the forex reserve with Indian bonds. This means no issuance to the market - so yields don't HAVE to go up because of supply (the RBI will hold the bonds, and never sell them).

In fact, we could issue special bonds at a lower interest rate - which will reflect the rate we are earning in forex anyhow. These bonds needn't ever be traded on the open market.

Now how does one get rupees? RBI will have to sell the dollars and get rupees. $10 billion of sales would drop the dollar about 5%? That's to a level, perhaps, of 47.5, from nearly 50 nowadays. This will tick off exporters - but hey, haven't we seen 39 recently? 47.5 is good enough. Plus, a weaker dollar helps our imports - and we must stimulate our LOCAL economy more than our exports, because the world outside is destroying itself.

And then, why stop at $10 billion? or $30 billion? Eventually we have to let the rupee float. So take out as much as required, and when the rupee floats, we can buy dollars back when required. Remember, our economy CAN be stimulated because of the enormous capital in black money lying around; but it may require money of the order of $100 bn or so. In doing so, if the economy recovers fast AND we float the rupee, dollars will come in from all over the world - and that is likely to let us keep our dollar liability restricted.

This might have other issues I haven't thought about. Inputs are much appreciated, of course, as comments or by email.

Barcamp Delhi 6, This Weekend

No Comments » Written on February 24th, 2009 by
Categories: Uncategorized
I'm going to Barcamp Delhi 6 this weekend (28-Feb to 1-Mar). The event is usually a deep technical discussion but it seems the format this time is more generous. Hey, I'm a techie but I'll go many ways.

A few financial sessions are on: one on FIX (a protocol for order management,routing etc.) another on the financial crisis by Pankaj Jain, and two sessions named "Recession, Jobs and Startups" and "Youth Marketing and Entrepreneurship Opportunties in Down Turn".

If I find a slot I'll talk a little bit too on investing/trading. If any readers are around, I'd love to say hi.

Good RBS, Bad RBS

1 Comment » Written on February 22nd, 2009 by
Categories: Uncategorized
Royal Bank of Scotland is splitting into two:
The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) is to be split into a “good bank” and “bad bank” in a dramatic rescue restructuring in which assets worth several hundred billion pounds will be put up for sale.

Stephen Hester, RBS chief executive, will outline the plans this week as he unveils Britain’s biggest-ever corporate loss of up to £28 billion. He will cut costs by more than £1 billion a year, a move expected to lead to the loss of about 20,000 jobs, more than half of which will be in Britain.

...

RBS will also place at least £200 billion of toxic assets into the government’s asset-protection scheme, a controversial insurance scheme designed to protect banks against further losses.

Billionaire investor Wilbur Ross leads a pack of vulture funds that are talking to the bank and the government about buying some of the bad loans, although it is unlikely a deal will be agreed in time for Thursday’s results. Virgin Money, Sir Richard Branson’s mortgage business, is another possible buyer.

The “good bank” will comprise retail and commercial banking in Britain, America and a handful of other countries where RBS has a significant presence.

So Infy was their "Best Technology Supplier" in 2007. Does it get the good bank, or the bad bank or both? Will there be enough work left, given most of the bad bank assets will be hived off? We'll have to wait and see.

Some UK taxpayers must be pissed. Calculated Risk says they can put what they want in the bad bank, they take only the first 10% of losses - the UK taxpayer takes the rest.

Interestingly, they say they'll do the same to Northern Rock. If everyone follows this model, we'll have to change all the IVR software:

"Welcome to Big Bank. If you want the good bank, press 1. If you want the bad bank, don't bother, we don't take any phone calls. We're that bad. Oh, and thanks for your taxes."

Links and more links

No Comments » Written on February 20th, 2009 by
Categories: Uncategorized
Lots of links: Bad news, bad news and more bad news. I'm just numb.

Feb 18 2009: Inflation at 3.92%

2 comments Written on February 19th, 2009 by
Categories: Inflation
Inflation data is out. It's now at 3.92%, a 1.5 year low.

The all-time low is 3.07% on 13 October 2007. But look at the slope at that time - there was no deflationary trend, just a flattening of the curve. This time, there's a definite trend downwards.

If the Index stays at this level, even if it doesn't go down further, we reach a deflationary environment by 11 April 09. Amazingly, election campaigning will be happening right then.

See also: Inflation at 6.61%, going lower