Archive for June, 2009

Matt Taibbi And The Goldman Saga

10 comments Written on June 30th, 2009 by
Categories: Goldman
Goldman Sachs, in my opinion, has started its descent. For years, it has been out there, surviving crisis after crisis, managing to make tons of money and pay handsome bonuses even in tough years. It's built a solid house - nearly everyone in a top-level economic position in the US seems to be from Goldman. But that foundation seems to be rotting now, and the cracks in the wall are getting more and more evident.

Matt Taibbi has a great piece on Goldman (scanned in by Zero Hedge) Taibbi-Goldman-Sachs (Btw, Goldman countered, and Taibbi replied with another scathing column)

Tyler at Zero Hedge has done a great job exposing chinks in the Goldman armor, and so has Mike Morgan at http://www.goldmansachs666.com. Goldman seems to feel it - the oldies are closing ranks and keeping lids on data, and pursuing random legal options to keep such sites at bay. But there's too much out there known already.

Read the article - from market manipulation to blatant disregard for the rules and ethics in the game, there's stories of them all. (Oil will be at $100! Oil at $200! oh wait. Oil is now at $30? Frik, Oil at $75! ) Matt doesn't spare the ex-Goldman ex-Treasury Secretary Paulson either, and has scant respect for the insiders of all the big banks.

It seems to me that Goldman could be the next Enron. There's a lot of financial shit waiting to hit the fan - probably the worst kind since the Great Depression - and Goldman may just end up being a high-profile casualty. Or will they make it through this time too?

15,000 cr. bond auction hits subscription wall at the long end

2 comments Written on June 30th, 2009 by
Categories: Bonds
After weeks of full subscription to the 15,000 crore weekly bond issuances, last Friday's bond sale was not fully subscribed. Around 900 cr. could not be sold, and devolved on the primary dealers. (That means, the primary dealers had to pay up because not enough valid bids were received below the cut-off yield)

The devolvement was only in the 18 and 26 year issue with a yield cut-off above 7.8% - the shorter term paper, 5 and 12 year bonds, were more than 2x oversubscribed. It may not be a very big deal, but it may give the government the feeler that large ticket bond sales can't sustain subscription too long.

There are other sources of government funding: PSU disinvestment and 3G auctions are likely in the next few months. Bond sales might end up slowing down, even if only to ease supply temporarily. With the budget coming up though, all bets are off - this government can throw us a socialist googly like it has so often in the past.

Reverse Repo at a high

5 comments Written on June 24th, 2009 by
Categories: Uncategorized
A look at the reverse repo growth over the last few months is interesting:

The reverse repo level crossed 100K cr. every day in April - a typical spike time when new deposits are gathered. But it's been staying up and the one month average is at an all time high.

Reverse repo is the money parked by banks with RBI, and yields 3.25%, even lesser than the standard savings account interest (3.5%). That means banks are choosing to lend to RBI at lower than they have to pay savings bank holders for the money. Is this typical?

What is interesting is that the last two spikes have come in pretty tough times - July 07 (Subprime crisis) and May 06 (market crash). Typically this means banks are reluctant to lend outside and prefer to keep money with the RBI for the shortest term possible. Business Standard says that new deposits have added 133K cr. to the banking system, but credit has contracted by 38 K crore. Which obviously means banks are reluctant to lend.

But why? I thought our economy is recovering and going back to a 10% growth rate or whatever. Someone forgot to tell the banks?

Mahindra Holidays IPO: My View

17 comments Written on June 19th, 2009 by
Categories: IPO, MahindraHolidays
After a long time, I've decided to analyse an IPO draft prospectus. Note that this is not advice, just my opinion.

Price: 275 to 325.
Size: 92.65 Lakh shares (255 to 301 cr.). Of which, 59 lakh are fresh issuances, and the remaining are for sale by existing investors.
Date: June 23 to 26, 2009

What do they do?

Club Mahindra, run by them, is a time-share and vacation holiday business. They own 23 resorts and are linked with RCI to about 4600 others. Effectively, to join their "network", you pay them a huge upfront fee - around Rs. 2.5 lakhs - and you get 25 years of membership, with 7 days a year available on any of their (or RCI's) resorts free of cost. Or, inflation free, as they put it.

Like most timeshares, the costs are hidden. Srinidhi Hande runs an excellent blog, and has written a review of the Club Mahindra membership. He mentions that the club membership costs between 2 and 7 lakhs including taxes. Additionally, one pays Rs. 7,500 to Rs. 14,000 on annual fees, regardless of whether they take holidays. Overall, this is not very exciting to someone who isn't bowled over by their presentation.

  • At 2.5 lakhs, at a savings rate of 8% a year (using P.O. deposit rates) you're actually paying Rs. 20,000 a year. Plus, the 7,500 annual fees adds up to Rs. 27,500. For a week, that's about 4,000 per day. At the Rs. 2.5 lakh studio room membership, you are unlikely to get peak season bookings. For what it's worth, you will pay Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 4,500 per day for most of these resorts if you book externally - all of them are available for "non-members".
  • (Don't consider that you lose the entire 2.5 lakhs at the end of 25 years- otherwise you'd have to do a complex reducing balance calculation)
  • You hope that you will get the rooms when you want, in the place that you want, and in the hotel of your choice. If they have no rooms available during your kids vacations (surprise!), bad luck, try next year. Costs escalate when you consider this.
  • Given that you're paying upfront, you are unlikely to get top service - after all service comes with the expectancy of repeat business, of a payout at the end. When you have committed to repeat business, and have already paid, what are the chances you'll be treated as well as, say, a walk-in visitor who's booked as a "non-member"? The incentives don't quite work in your favour.
  • If you decide, at any time, to use your vacation at a non-Club-Mahindra place for a particular year, you are paying Rs. 4,000 more per day from the already sunk cost. They'll probably tell you that your days can be sold, but in practise this is extremely cumbersome.
  • Holidaying has been inflation proof for the most part, in the last few years, all things considered. Goa still costs the same for 3 and 4 star resorts as it used to in 2005, in fact you could get hotels at lesser. I honeymooned in Goa, and even today would pay the same rate for the same hotel (Taj at Fort Aguada). Even if you consider that average rates were around Rs. 2000 per night in 1999 and are about Rs. 4000 now, that's a 7% CAGR - just about meeting inflation. At the increase of holiday opportunities - you could holiday cheaper in Bangkok, Malaysia or Dubai - and the increase in number of resorts, one can expect that the next ten years will not see huge price increases.
That's just what I think of the business model, of course. And I don't think it's sustainable. Once a friend or an acquaintance gets sucked in, a person usually "wises up"; it's very rare to see many related people buying the membership. Nowadays, it even seems to be a matter of shame, like "I got suckered". But that's my inference, please make your own.

How do people like their service?

First, a personal opinion. I have only heard of people being dissatisfied. From friends who couldn't get any rooms when they wanted, to others who couldn't get refunds, or even get anyone to answer their call, nearly all responses were negative. The only positives I got were for individual resorts, but like a friend said "You will get that even if you book as a non-member".

Let's also look at published (negative) opinions on the service or lack thereof:

Positive stuff: I could only find some positive reviews on the individual resorts.

If you're looking to buy or sell your membership check out Srinidhi's page with an excel sheet of sellers and prices listed - list your membership there for selling, and if you're looking to buy you can get much better deals here.

Club Mahindra is only one of their offerings. They also have Zest, the 10 year version of the above. And a corporate package deal called Fundays, a holiday travel website at clubmahindra.travel and Mahindra Homestays.

What does this have to do with the IPO?

Very little, really. Having crappy service or crappy products has never meant that the company won't grow in a stellar way going forward. But this has been a subject close to heart, so I wanted to write about. Let's get on with the financials and stuff.

What are the figures like?

They have 1261 apartments/cottages, and nearly 96,000 members. This might pose a small problem because each room can only be used 52 times a year (one week for a member). That's about 66,000 member nights available, meaning 30% of their members can't be currently accomodated, more if you consider "non-members". The official response is that many members don't get eligible, either by being early on EMIs or by default, but that isn't good enough as an explanation - simply put, they need a LOT more investment before they can scale revenues, or they will lose a substantial amount of goodwill and membership.

Earnings: FY 2009 revenue was 442 cr. up 17% YOY. Net income was down 6% at 79.8 cr.

They currently have 7.83 cr. shares in issue, so their EPS is 10. So at the price band (275 to 325) the P/E ratio is 27 to 32. This is ridiculously high for a company that has flattened profit growth and is saturated on capacity.

How will they use the money? They'll spend 211 cr. on five resorts (new and expansions) which will add 500 rooms to their kitty. Note that this will add 26,000 member nights over two years, still not quite enough to satisfy their current member count. And I believe they will need to grow their member count if they have to increase revenues.

Still, there's another problem. The IPO has only 59 lakh new shares - the rest are an offer for sale, in which the company gets nothing. At the upper price of the band, Rs. 325, they will collect 192 cr. They spend 210 cr. but only collect 192 cr. max, and have to pay around 6% management fees, listing fees etc. They do stagger spending over two years but the shortfall will have to be met elsewhere. Perhaps by some debt.

They've securitised receivables for 150 cr. and if a customer defaults, they have to make good the shortfall. This is not good, if you consider that there will be reasonable dissatisfaction among customers due to lack of room inventory. They also have about 100 cr. of debt on their books.

Conclusion: Given that:

  • They have about 30% more members than room nights
  • New capacity from this public issue will not even satisfy current membership, leave alone new members
  • Ensuing loss of members or defaults can impact cash flow negatively, since they have securitized receivables.
  • Customer dissatisfaction, from what I hear, is very high
  • They're asking for a P/E of 27 to 32 on very small EPS growth in the past, and very little expected in the future
I will not subscribe for this IPO.

This is not advice so I would encourage readers to come to their own conclusions. I'd rather see this company scale up inventory and build a more satisfied set of customers, and see the tourism cycle go through its downturn before considering investing, at any price. Perhaps in three-four years. But given my horrendous record of looking at IPOs, it might just be that this share doubles on listing. That's another reason why you should come to your own conclusion!

Inflation dips below 0. at -1.61% now.

3 comments Written on June 18th, 2009 by
Categories: Inflation
India's Wholesale Price Index has fallen compared to last year, giving us the first negative figure in 30 years, with a -1.61% printed. Of course this may be revised, etc.

The longer term trend seems to be intact, so no deflation per se. Food is an inordinately higher weighted component of WPI, and deflating factors like housing aren't quite well represented (though forming a significant percentage of expenses).

Still, a negative number is helpful in reducing inflationary fears. Now if the slope of the curve were to dip, that would be dangerous.

Why you shouldn’t believe predictions, including mine

10 comments Written on June 16th, 2009 by
Categories: Uncategorized
Because they can be just plain wrong. I wrote as my prediction for this year, in my Diwali post:
It will not be a year for the index. The index may gyrate between 1500 and 4000 (Nifty) and is likely to face sharp upmoves and slow downmoves through the year. It will not be worthwhile to invest in the broad index.
Ha! We are at 4500, so I was wrong. Just for the record.

There are no excuses. I was wrong. That's it.

If I were a commentator on a TV channel I might have introduced different factors here, involving words like "game changing elections", "strong India growth story" etc. That would trigger most readers' bullshit alert, apart from making me feel like a weasel. So I gladly admit that I was wrong.

Given that I'm a stubborn mule, I will continue to predict; after all, that's the freedom one has when writing a personal blog. I just hope I continue to have the good sense to eat my own words.

FII Investments – Any leading indicators?

2 comments Written on June 14th, 2009 by
Categories: FII
I mapped all FII investment data, (net daily, since 2006, when it's been made available) from the NSE Web site to check if FII data had any leading indicator of market moves.

I've plotted 20 day and 120 day cumulative totals of the "net" investment by FIIs (right axis) and the Nifty (left axis). There's not much correlation on the upside - in fact the FIIs seem to flatten out as the moves get really strong. But on the downside it's apparent that FIIs yank out money. They invest when things are "stable".

In a few cases above - Jan 2008 and Oct 2008 - it has been seen that FIIs have pulled out money before the crashes, as evidenced by the fall in the cumulatives just before the crashes. But that hasn't happened in the mini-crashes of March 2007 and Oct 2007 (their taking out money coincided with the market crash, but did not precede it).

It's too little data to make a prediction but it appears that FIIs 20 day cumulative figures don't usually stay above zero for too long. The last two months though, it has stayed above zero, as is at 10000 cr. now. Let's see where it goes.

S&P gets wiser, Realpoint moves in to fill the "gap"

No Comments » Written on June 12th, 2009 by
Categories: MakeRatingAgenciesIrrelevant
Time for some rating agency news. S&P threatens to cut CMBS ratings, so people are rushing to Realpoint (news by Reuters), another yet-to-be-approved CMBS rating agency. (HT: Zero Hedge)
U.S. credit rating company Realpoint on Thursday said insurers may soon be allowed to use its commercial mortgage bond ratings and preserve capital if rival Standard & Poor's moves to slash its designations.

...

S&P shocked the the CMBS market last week by advising that its new models, if adopted, would likely prompt ratings cuts on 95 percent of top bonds issued during the peak of the real estate cycle in 2007 and 85 percent of CMBS from 2006. S&P is mulling responses from a formal request for comment.

Some 50 insurers have contacted Horsham, Pennsylvania-based Realpoint over the last few days, saying, "you guys need to get approved" by the NAIC, Dobilas said.

"Realpoint acts as a trump card to any action that S&P takes," he said. "We don't perceive any problem" getting approved by the NAIC, he added.

...

Analysts fear the cuts by S&P would cause a wave of selling by investors, including insurers, who are limited to AAA-rated securities. Downgrades are also seen as a threat to a Federal Reserve program to boost lending in U.S. commercial real estate as the central bank currently requires bonds eligible for the program carry only AAA ratings.

First, the rating agencies go temporarily blind, seeing only $$ signs and forgetting that they have to actually rate the darn securities. By the time they remember, too many people have bought it, and those people get really pissed off; not because S&P did a bad job in the first place, but because they have to bloody sell if S&P downgrades. They would much rather get someone else to rate the crap as AAA, than sell and actually say they were stupid enough to believe S&P in the first place.

SO now the deal is to get a different rating agency approved, but only if S&P changes its model and downgrades the securities. Most of them are already junk - their prices will probably prove it. But we can't downgrade them, no sir, because, well, because.

The problem is this: Some funds and insurers are forced to buy AAA only. if AAA falls to zero, they can still hold it. If AAA falls by 1% but is downgraded to AA, they have to sell. This is the issue. It's the regulation that REQUIRES a rating. Get rid of that, and no one will give a flying duck about what S&P thinks.

It's time really, to make them rating agencies irrelevant.