IPO

Jubilant Foodworks’ Listing Gains at 58%

5 comments Written on February 9th, 2010 by
Categories: IPO

A stock out of nowhere propelled to new highs today (ok, technically anything is a new high for a freshly listed stock). A 58% listing gain saw Jubilant Foodworks close at 229 today: (HT: @prashantsolanki)

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ET Story:

A spectacular debut by Jubilant FoodWorks, which runs the Domino’s Pizza chain in India, on the bourses on Monday has come as a welcome break for a market spooked by a string of subdued first-day performances by companies newly listing their scrips. At the end of the day Jubilant Food-Works was valued at Rs 1,456 crore which compares favourably with the $622 million (around Rs 3,000 crore) market cap of the New York Stock Exchange-listed Dominos Pizzas Inc on Monday evening. The Rs 330-crore IPO proved to be an exception to most recent issues, as it offered hefty returns to investors on the first day of listing.

You would think this was a little shady, because Jubilant has 286 stores in India and, er, the US company is 8,000 stores. Jubilant is only a franchisee and can’t do a thing other than what it’s got agreed with Dominos. They’ve made about 12 cr. in the first 6 months of this financial year, on a turnover of about 182 cr. – a margin of 5 to 6%. With the 6cr. shares outstanding the Earnings per Share was about Rs. 4 (annualized) and at the current price, the P/E ratio is 55.

With 6 crore shares outstanding, and most of the IPO proceeds (nearly 80%) going to existing shareholders, the company wouldn’t have benefited much. Only 40 lakh shares would be a fresh issue (of an issue size of 2.2 cr. shares) – which at a price of Rs. 145 would have raised only 58 crores.

It’s a low margin business; Even with the fresh cash they are unlikely to earn a lot more. As Deven Choksey says, this is a stretched valuation by most means. The stock should go down, though I don’t know when. Classic Pump-and-dump, don’t get caught.

Oil India IPO

1 Comment » Written on September 9th, 2009 by
Categories: IPO
A lot of you have requested comments on the Oil India IPO. I'm a sucker for IPOs which give you a P/E or 10 or so, and it seems this one fits. So my first impression is positive. Here's what happens as I go through the DHRP (prospectus).

There's 2.4 cr. shares on offer, at 950 to 1050 per share. That gets them 2400 crores. As I write the issue is already 2.5x oversubscribed, though there's not yet full subscription in the retail category. So getting allotment will be tough.

OIL is an oil company (surprise!) and it looks like a proxy for crude prices. It's worse because it needs to subsidize the Public Sector OMCs against huge price rises - so it doesn't make as much on the upside as it loses when crude goes down.

They'll spend most of the money in exploration and maintenance. Which is good, but I don't really have the time to go through the points in detail. There's a huge dependence on the north-east, but that also reduces pipeline costs and such. They have an about 575 million barrels of crude estimated - to give you context, India uses about 3 million barrels a day, approximately.

Their EPS, in the last three years, was Rs. 71.98, 83.16 and 104.24 respectively. That's a healthy growth and the upper band P/E is thus about 10.5. All else being equal, this is a competitor to ONGC, whose EPS is 92 and price is 1192 - a P/E of about 13.

Taken that way, it's a go; but I won't apply because I don't have ASBA (Application Supported with Blocked Amount) set up yet. If I had ASBA, I'd take a chance and apply in the retail category (the ASBA ensures I don't lose interest in the time that they take to process apps and list).

So yes, for once, a good IPO. A thumbs-up from me, but remember: I'm not an advisor and I haven't even done the deep level of research I usually do. This is an "on-the-face-of-it" analysis.

Borrowing to buy IPOs – Another Bubble in the making

No Comments » Written on August 13th, 2009 by
Categories: IPO
LIvemint/Reuters: Brokers making costly loans to IPO speculators
Mumbai: Indian brokerages are borrowing ultra short-term money at almost twice the market rate, often from mutual funds, to lend to clients seeking shares in IPOs, fund managers said, in a sign of froth building in the market.

...

Brokerages have between them borrowed up to Rs100 billion ($2.1 billion) for IPO financing in the last few weeks, the fund managers said. None of the brokers would comment.

“They are lending the 15 days paper at 7-8% levels for IPO funding,” said K. Ramkumar, head of fixed income at fund manager Sundaram BNP Paribas. He declined to name the issuers.

Three-month commercial paper pays a coupon of about 4.5%.

The brokerages are issuing secured non-convertible debentures with a 15-day call option to fund houses and are lending the money to their rich clients at a minimum 11.5% and as much as 20%, the fund managers said.

Markets went up 3% today. They have been falling for a while - though the NHPC IPO got oversubscribed 23 times, that means nearly 120,000 cr. got applied; some of that money must have come from the secondary markets, which explains it dipping, and it looks like the borrowing at high rates to get even higher returns has started.

I'd written a post about it in Feb 2008 (Borrowing for IPOs are loser loans) which, come to think of it, was just about when the markets had tanked; IPO loans were very popular then. If history is a guide, this is a sign of bad things to come.

NHPC IPO: P/E of 36

10 comments Written on August 8th, 2009 by
Categories: IPO
I've had some mail requesting for comments on the NHPC IPO. First note: the IPO is already 3x oversubscribed, with only one day of the IPO through. Only 9% of the retail bit is subscribed, and this has 49 cr. shares for retail (about 1500 cr.) which is fairly large. Still, that's only 1.5 lakh retail individuals (each is capped to a max of 1 lakh) and there are enough people who will apply using fictitious names, fake demat accounts etc. There is serious moral hazard here - In the Yes Bank IPO scam case, SEBI got active and banned Karvy, IndiaBulls and Anagram but each one of them got away on technicalities. The big person behind the scam, Roopalben Panchal, who applied for the Yes Bank IPO in 6,315 different names with the same address, has not been arrested, and is free today. An article says 90 cr. has been collected by selling shares - but 90cr. is nothing lost by the perpetrators, and nobody's gone to jail, so this is no deal.

But that's a different story, and the frauds will continue to milk the IPOs. Even if there was a jail sentence. Because the odds of getting caught are small - Ms. Panchal was an outlier; there are hundreds of others, unknown and known, that do this kind of fraud on nearly every IPO.

This also means you SHOULD apply to good IPOs. With ASBA, your money is not blocked for long and you continue to earn interest in your bank account. By applying you ensure that these fraudsters get even lesser allocation - the more legit people that participate, the less space there is for these scamsters. So they'll be forced to raise the scale of their operation and hopefully, if our regulators aren't sleeping or in a government-pressure-induced-coma they will get caught.

But is NHPC a good IPO? I won't mull over much but the basics:

  • It's a hydel power company, with a current capacity of 5000 MW.
  • NHPC, in it's IPO, is selling 168 cr. shares between Rs. 30 to 36. The price has changed dramatically - an earlier prospectus talked about Rs. 20-24 per share, and even earlier, there were talks of 16 per share being the limit.
  • Out of this, 1/3rd of proceeds will go to the government, and the remaining to the company. At Rs. 36, this is about 2000 cr. to the govt, 4000 cr. to the company.
  • They have made 1244 cr. on a consolidates basis, on a current share capital of 1124 cr. shares. That's an EPS of about Rs. 1.1 per share.
  • At a price of 36, that's a P/E band of 27 to 32.
  • What are they using the money for? For 7 power plants, total capacity about 3300 MW, which will cost 14,000 cr. (equity+debt). The plants will all be ready only by 2011.
  • If their 5000 MW current capacity delivers Rs. 1124 cr - We can stretch and say the 8,300 MW will deliver about 2000 cr. of profit? Let's say 2500 crores. At the expanded equity of about 1300 cr. shares, that's about Rs. 2 EPS. If you expect that in 2012, it's a 22% EPS growth CAGR. That's still way below the current P/E.
  • In the last three years, EPS has grown at less than 10% a year compounded.
I wouldn't buy this IPO on fundamentals. It is way overpriced. At 20-24 there might have been something in there, though it would only be a "fair" price - remember, you gotta buy at dirt-cheap valuations so you get some appreciation.

And given the sentiment even this one will go overboard in terms of subscription, and then list even higher. Irrational exuberance perhaps, but who am I to stand in the way of this juggernaut? And this stock is ripe for trading - will at this price end up as a component of the Nifty, will get F&O approval, and has the grand ability to give huge visual gains on the minimum tick size of 5 paise. So yeah, it's worth trading.

Otherwise, it's a dim IPO. The price-to-quality gets worse and worse with every bull market, it seems.

Mahindra Holidays IPO: My View

17 comments Written on June 19th, 2009 by
Categories: IPO, MahindraHolidays
After a long time, I've decided to analyse an IPO draft prospectus. Note that this is not advice, just my opinion.

Price: 275 to 325.
Size: 92.65 Lakh shares (255 to 301 cr.). Of which, 59 lakh are fresh issuances, and the remaining are for sale by existing investors.
Date: June 23 to 26, 2009

What do they do?

Club Mahindra, run by them, is a time-share and vacation holiday business. They own 23 resorts and are linked with RCI to about 4600 others. Effectively, to join their "network", you pay them a huge upfront fee - around Rs. 2.5 lakhs - and you get 25 years of membership, with 7 days a year available on any of their (or RCI's) resorts free of cost. Or, inflation free, as they put it.

Like most timeshares, the costs are hidden. Srinidhi Hande runs an excellent blog, and has written a review of the Club Mahindra membership. He mentions that the club membership costs between 2 and 7 lakhs including taxes. Additionally, one pays Rs. 7,500 to Rs. 14,000 on annual fees, regardless of whether they take holidays. Overall, this is not very exciting to someone who isn't bowled over by their presentation.

  • At 2.5 lakhs, at a savings rate of 8% a year (using P.O. deposit rates) you're actually paying Rs. 20,000 a year. Plus, the 7,500 annual fees adds up to Rs. 27,500. For a week, that's about 4,000 per day. At the Rs. 2.5 lakh studio room membership, you are unlikely to get peak season bookings. For what it's worth, you will pay Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 4,500 per day for most of these resorts if you book externally - all of them are available for "non-members".
  • (Don't consider that you lose the entire 2.5 lakhs at the end of 25 years- otherwise you'd have to do a complex reducing balance calculation)
  • You hope that you will get the rooms when you want, in the place that you want, and in the hotel of your choice. If they have no rooms available during your kids vacations (surprise!), bad luck, try next year. Costs escalate when you consider this.
  • Given that you're paying upfront, you are unlikely to get top service - after all service comes with the expectancy of repeat business, of a payout at the end. When you have committed to repeat business, and have already paid, what are the chances you'll be treated as well as, say, a walk-in visitor who's booked as a "non-member"? The incentives don't quite work in your favour.
  • If you decide, at any time, to use your vacation at a non-Club-Mahindra place for a particular year, you are paying Rs. 4,000 more per day from the already sunk cost. They'll probably tell you that your days can be sold, but in practise this is extremely cumbersome.
  • Holidaying has been inflation proof for the most part, in the last few years, all things considered. Goa still costs the same for 3 and 4 star resorts as it used to in 2005, in fact you could get hotels at lesser. I honeymooned in Goa, and even today would pay the same rate for the same hotel (Taj at Fort Aguada). Even if you consider that average rates were around Rs. 2000 per night in 1999 and are about Rs. 4000 now, that's a 7% CAGR - just about meeting inflation. At the increase of holiday opportunities - you could holiday cheaper in Bangkok, Malaysia or Dubai - and the increase in number of resorts, one can expect that the next ten years will not see huge price increases.
That's just what I think of the business model, of course. And I don't think it's sustainable. Once a friend or an acquaintance gets sucked in, a person usually "wises up"; it's very rare to see many related people buying the membership. Nowadays, it even seems to be a matter of shame, like "I got suckered". But that's my inference, please make your own.

How do people like their service?

First, a personal opinion. I have only heard of people being dissatisfied. From friends who couldn't get any rooms when they wanted, to others who couldn't get refunds, or even get anyone to answer their call, nearly all responses were negative. The only positives I got were for individual resorts, but like a friend said "You will get that even if you book as a non-member".

Let's also look at published (negative) opinions on the service or lack thereof:

Positive stuff: I could only find some positive reviews on the individual resorts.

If you're looking to buy or sell your membership check out Srinidhi's page with an excel sheet of sellers and prices listed - list your membership there for selling, and if you're looking to buy you can get much better deals here.

Club Mahindra is only one of their offerings. They also have Zest, the 10 year version of the above. And a corporate package deal called Fundays, a holiday travel website at clubmahindra.travel and Mahindra Homestays.

What does this have to do with the IPO?

Very little, really. Having crappy service or crappy products has never meant that the company won't grow in a stellar way going forward. But this has been a subject close to heart, so I wanted to write about. Let's get on with the financials and stuff.

What are the figures like?

They have 1261 apartments/cottages, and nearly 96,000 members. This might pose a small problem because each room can only be used 52 times a year (one week for a member). That's about 66,000 member nights available, meaning 30% of their members can't be currently accomodated, more if you consider "non-members". The official response is that many members don't get eligible, either by being early on EMIs or by default, but that isn't good enough as an explanation - simply put, they need a LOT more investment before they can scale revenues, or they will lose a substantial amount of goodwill and membership.

Earnings: FY 2009 revenue was 442 cr. up 17% YOY. Net income was down 6% at 79.8 cr.

They currently have 7.83 cr. shares in issue, so their EPS is 10. So at the price band (275 to 325) the P/E ratio is 27 to 32. This is ridiculously high for a company that has flattened profit growth and is saturated on capacity.

How will they use the money? They'll spend 211 cr. on five resorts (new and expansions) which will add 500 rooms to their kitty. Note that this will add 26,000 member nights over two years, still not quite enough to satisfy their current member count. And I believe they will need to grow their member count if they have to increase revenues.

Still, there's another problem. The IPO has only 59 lakh new shares - the rest are an offer for sale, in which the company gets nothing. At the upper price of the band, Rs. 325, they will collect 192 cr. They spend 210 cr. but only collect 192 cr. max, and have to pay around 6% management fees, listing fees etc. They do stagger spending over two years but the shortfall will have to be met elsewhere. Perhaps by some debt.

They've securitised receivables for 150 cr. and if a customer defaults, they have to make good the shortfall. This is not good, if you consider that there will be reasonable dissatisfaction among customers due to lack of room inventory. They also have about 100 cr. of debt on their books.

Conclusion: Given that:

  • They have about 30% more members than room nights
  • New capacity from this public issue will not even satisfy current membership, leave alone new members
  • Ensuing loss of members or defaults can impact cash flow negatively, since they have securitized receivables.
  • Customer dissatisfaction, from what I hear, is very high
  • They're asking for a P/E of 27 to 32 on very small EPS growth in the past, and very little expected in the future
I will not subscribe for this IPO.

This is not advice so I would encourage readers to come to their own conclusions. I'd rather see this company scale up inventory and build a more satisfied set of customers, and see the tourism cycle go through its downturn before considering investing, at any price. Perhaps in three-four years. But given my horrendous record of looking at IPOs, it might just be that this share doubles on listing. That's another reason why you should come to your own conclusion!

Reliance Power Bonus Still Yields No Value

8 comments Written on February 18th, 2008 by
Categories: Commentary, IPO, ReliancePower
I've changed this post in accordance with extremely recent news that the bonus is likely to be 1:3 or 1:5. I moved the P/E down to 14 from 15, and readjusted share prices. Slightly higher rate of return, but the net effect remains the same.

Amit commented in my last RPOWER post:

You are ignoring the fact that of the total market cap, investors will hold 19% instead of 10%. This amounts to adjusting the issue price downwards without explicitly saying so. the market performance has actually forced them to part with a larger slice at the same cash inflow.
Firstly I must say I agree with Amit that the promoters are letting go of some stake. But having said that, let's look at the math.

They currently have 226 crore shares, with 22.8 cr. shares held by the public. They have about 12,000 cr. of cash (10,000 from the IPO, and 2000 from the promoters) That's worth about Rs. 53 per share.

Now if they issue 1 bonus share for every three held, to only the public, that's another 7.6 cr. shares. So they will have around 234 cr. share. The cash they have is now worth about Rs. 51.2 per share.

Their prospects - let's say they were to make Rs. 15,000 cr. in 2015. (NTPC, which has the same capacity as RPOWER will have in 2016, makes 7000 cr. so let's give it a good double of that) That's an EPS of Rs. 64 per share. Take a 14 P/E: That's about Rs. 900 per share. From Rs. 400 today, that's a gain of Rs. 500 in 7 years. But for 400 shares today you should get the 1:3 bonus, effectively a price of Rs. 300 per share. Gains then are Rs. 600 per share.

On a percentage basis, this is a 17% return, compounded and annualised.

And that is at DOUBLE the profit of NTPC today (with the same capacity) and assuming no further dilution. (Promoters have the right to buy 10% more capital based on warrants, which, looking at promoters recently, is bound to happen)

So you are getting, in an optimistic scenario, a 17% annualised return. This is still quite optimistic and does not sound like great value to me. In comparison, buying NTPC which will have some three times RPOWER's capacity may be better, because at similar P/E you will get five times the return.

Tough scenario: 10 P/E, 10,000 cr. profit in 2015. Market price then: Rs. 420 per share after 7 years. 5% return.

There are other methods of valuation - a value based on replacement cost per megawatt etc. On these parameters, Reliance Power's 2015 valuation is just a little higher than today's rates (around Rs. 430).

Let's say, someone just sold you a Maruti Swift saying it was a Mercedes, and you paid 25 lakhs. Now they gave you back 5 lakhs. Does that make happier? You still paid 20 lakhs for a Maruti Swift, no?

But look at the momentum. Stock's up at 416 today, 8%. They say that when you take drugs, you first get the euphoria and then the big depressions. This market is just like a drug - there's a downside and we may know it, but as long as we keep getting shots, we're euphoric.

Reliance Power In The Doldrums

5 comments Written on February 11th, 2008 by
Categories: IPO, ReliancePower
The Reliance Power stock has had a shocking listing (excuse the pun). With an issue price of Rs. 450, the stock started off at Rs. 530 and then went into a steep fall. As I write, it's standing at Rs. 420, and it had briefly gone below the 400 levels too.

Obviously this is doom for the greedy IPO followers, and specially for the loser loan takers. It's harsh on them that the price is below the offer price, and worse if they have to pay interest on a loan! Plus, it's likely that they got some obscenely low number of shares. (if you were lucky you would get 17 shares, Rs. 9K worth - for an investment of 1 lakh, the rest of the money being refunded. You still have to pay interest if you borrowed the money, until you get the refund.)

RPower seems to have taken the Nifty with it. At 4900, the Nifty looks like it's ready for another steep fall. I should get out of whatever little investments I have

Disclosure: Long some stocks and mutual funds. No short positions. (Unfortunately)

Don’t Borrow Money For IPOs – They Are Loser Loans

7 comments Written on February 2nd, 2008 by
Categories: IPO, Stocks
Anyone going for IPO financing, in times like these, seems to be at the receiving end of the stick. Let's take the future capital ipo for instance, an IPO that was oversubscription a few gazillion times (editor: this translates to 131 times). From the Basis of Allocation chart, let's take a look at how people would have fared, had they borrowed money to invest in this fandangled IPO.

I'm going to assume the cost of funds was about 12%. Typical rates are 19%, but let's just say 12% (because you will put some of your money and borrow the rest). 12%, for 1 month (the time it takes to get your refunds back, so you can return the money you borrowed) translates to about 1%. Note that the IPO was priced at Rs 765 and the listing price on Friday closed at 909.

Retail bidders
For a 1 lakh bid, the basis says allocation was 8 shares for 6:19 - meaning about 1/3rd of applications got 8 shares each.

For the poor fellows who were part of the 2/3rd that got zilch, the loss is Rs. 1000 (interest), plus all the headache.

For the remaining 1/3rd, they got 8 shares. Profit per share was approximately Rs. 150, so they got Rs. 1,200 as profits. Of which, they'll pay about 1% of total cost (1 lakh) = Rs. 1000 as interest. So real profit = Rs. 200 for all the trouble and the hope that refunds happen within a month.

HNI bidders
These are the real bakras. The banks have really squeezed them on IPOs. Let's take a bid of say 16 lakhs. The allocation was 28 shares, FIRM - meaning all bidders for this size got allocation. The profit is 28 * 150 = Rs. 4,200. The interest cost is 16,000 (1% of the bid). The net LOSS for this is Rs. 12,000.

Let's go higher. For a 65 lakh bid, allocation was a firm 112 shares. Share profit 16,000, interest cost 65,000 - net loss of about 50,000.

Even higher. 11 crore bid, got 1900 shares (approx). Share profits of 3 lakhs, interest cost 11 lakhs - net loss is 8 lakhs.

Simply put: It makes ZERO sense to borrow money to buy IPOs at this time.

Does it make sense to put your own money into IPOs? The return at the 1 lakh level is Rs. 1,200 if you're lucky enough to get allocation - just about 1.2% for about a month. In general that is not bad, but there is too much risk for too little return. If I can get a 9-10% arbitrage return (on arb funds, post tax) I would not bother with something like IPOs; in fact if a stock lists well, you can buy on listing instead and even a small move upward will give you better returns.

(To compare - if I bought Future Capital today at 909, I will break even with the person who subscribed to the IPO for Rs. 1 lakh, if the price goes up just Rs. 15 from here. Net return at 1.5% is about the same as that)

Now this is why I don't subscribe to IPOs anymore, and this is the reason why I did not apply to the Reliance Power IPO. It makes no sense whatsoever.